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I. INTRODUCTION
We have in our country the patriotism of Ontarians, the pa-
triotism of Quebecers and the patriotism of Westerners, but
there is no Canadian patriotism, and there will not be a Canadian
nation as long as we do not have a Canadian patriotism.'
Canada's prolonged internal conflict between Quebec and the rest
of Canada has reached new heights. The Federal Government's attempt
to embrace Quebec and have Quebec ratify the Canada Act of 1982
© Copyright 1993, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. The late Henri Bourassa, journalist and politician, as described by Pierre Elliott
Trudeau, Say Goodbye to the Dream, in Meech Lake and Canada: Perspectives From
The West 65 (Roger Gibbins ed., 1982).
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has failed miserably, laying a foundation for unprecedented conflict with
potentially grave consequences. Instead of bringing harmony among the
Canadian people and legitimacy to the Canadian Constitution, the failed
attempt has divided the country. In the past, resolutions have been
found in temporary compromise. A resolution of this type will probably
not satisfy the current expectations of the Canadian people. Therefore,
either an all encompassing resolution or a valid approximation of one
is required if the entrenched and divergent interests are to be reconciled.
Internal crisis will reach an unprecedented level should this not be
achieved. 2 Separation of a province from Canada, or for that matter
sovereignty-association, would have profound effects upon Canadian
nationals, their legal status, treaties that Canada is party to, and, most
importantly, the Canadian economy. It is for these reasons that the
proper review of the following material is important to the future of
Canada.3
Globally, separation of countries has become a popular and sweeping
trend in the 1990s. Neither the concept nor the actual act of separation
itself is a recent development. What is novel is the acceptance of sep-
aration in unprecedented levels of form and propensity. The decline of
the Soviet Union has seen the fragmentation process accelerated in the
U.S.S.R.'s former sphere of influence. An example of this is Czechos-
lovakia, which has stepped out of Soviet shadows. Furthermore, Cze-
choslovakia's two dominant ethnic groups, the Czechs and Slovaks, have
negotiated a peaceful partition of the country. 4 The former Yugoslavia
finds itself torn apart by a bloody and inhuman civil war promulgated
by its divergent ethnic groups, primarily the Serbs, Bosnians, and Croats.5
The former Soviet Union itself separated on the basis of the prior Soviet
Socialist Republics and may be in the process of dividing further based
on ethnic, linguistic and religious lines (e.g., Armenians-who desire a
place in the region of the former Southwestern S.S.R.'s). 6 Canada may
2. After the failure of the Charlottetown Agreement, in October of 1992, Prime
Minister Mulroney called for a moratorium on constitutional reform until the Canadian
economy rebounded from the recession and lack of confidence in the Canadian dollar.
Patricia Chisolm, Weathering the Storm in Canada, Maclean's, Sept. 28, 1992, at 40.
3. It may be argued that strict legal compliance is of little importance and that
constitutional law is more political than legal. However, the constitutional law of Canada
is the basis of the structure of Canada and therefore it cannot be ignored. This is especially
true since the Constitution Act, 1982 has gained more prominence and been embraced
by most Canadians.
4. Czechoslovakia's Split Approved, Wall St. J., Nov. 27, 1992, at 6; Czechoslovak
Parliament Votes Division of the Nation on Jan.l., N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1992, at A5.
5. Michael S. Serrill, Underfire, Time, Jan. 18, 1993, at 32-34; Bruce W. Nelan,
Serbia's Spite, Time, Jan. 25, 1993, at 48-49.
6. The former Soviet Socialist Republic of Lithuania is an example of a successful
separation in Eastern Europe. Lithuania had first gained independence from Imperial
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be the first Western country to follow this trend. This comment addresses
the question of whether the constituent parts of Canada and its native
peoples have any constitutional or international "right" to separate.
Understanding the crisis in Canada requires that we first examine
what led to the current crisis and what Canadian constitutional law
provides in reference to separation. Due to the similarities they share
with Canada, a comparison to the United States and Australia is made
to examine how they have dealt with separation on constitutional grounds
and whether Canada can learn by their examples. International Law is
then discussed in relation to a province, a territory, or natives separating
from Canada with the purpose of determining whether separation is
justifiable under International Law and whether it provides a framework
for separation in Canada.
II. BACKGROUND-CANADA: MOVING TOWARDS SEPARATION
Canadian separatism has traditionally been based in Quebec, al-
though it has recently found proponents in Western Canada and the
First Nations.7 Separatism has been fueled in recent years by a renewal
in the Parti-Quebecois; s the formation of the Bloc Quebecois, 9 the Re-
Russia on February 16, 1918. For the next twenty years Lithuania was a secure nation
and, with its Baltic neighbors, Latvia and Estonia, a member of The League of Nations.
On June 15, 1940, Moscow claimed Lithuania violated Mutual Assistance treaties and
proceeded to militarily occupy the country, depose the government, and intern its leaders
in the Soviet Union. The Soviets occupied Lithuania until 1991.
Article 72 of the 1979 Soviet Constitution was enacted for the purpose of implementing
the self-determination provisions of the Helsinki Declaration. In theory, Article 72 granted
the right of secession to every Soviet Socialist Republic (S.S.R.). In March, 1990, Moscow
enacted a new law that laid the procedure by which a S.S.R. may secede. The new
secession provisions required that two-thirds of the all the S.S.R.s vote in favor of secession
in a popular referendum that allowed no campaigning. If the bid for secession were to
fail, then by law it could not be attempted for another ten years. If the bid for secession
was successful, then a five year period would be required by law to negotiate a separate
agreement with the seceding S.S.R. On February 9, 1991, the Lithuanians held a plebiscite
in which ninety percent of Lithuanians demanded independence.
After the failed August 1991 coup against Gorbachev, the Soviet state machine broke
down; on September 6, 1991, the Soviet Union formally recognized Lithuania. Col. James
P. Terry, Lithuanian Independence and International Law: A Retrospective Examination,
40 Naval L. Rev. 133, 138-40 (1992).
7. "First Nations" is a term used in Canada to describe the Canadian descendants
of the original inhabitants of the North American continent. Inuit and Metis are included
as First Nations. Patrick Macklem, First Nations Self-Government and the Borders of
the Canadian Legal Imagination, 36 McGill L.J. 382 n.l (1991).
8. The Parti Quebecois (P.Q.) is a provincial political party in the province of
Quebec. In 1968, the separatist groups Movement Souveraineti-Association, and the Ras-
semblement Pour L'Independence joined together and formed the P.Q. The P.Q. was the
reigning party in Quebec from 1976 to 1985 and today still remains a potent force in
135919931
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form Party,10 and the Confederation of Regions" parties; the failure of
the Meech Lake Accord; 12 the failure of the Charlottetown Agreement; 3
and the increased desire and militancy by Canadian natives for self-
government. 4 Canada's particular mode of politics-balancing a region's
Quebec politics. The main platform of the P.Q. is to strive to protect Quebec as a distinct
society from the rest of Canada. At one time the P.Q. believed this could only be achieved
by secession/separation. Since the 1980 Quebec referendum and the Quebec public's
reluctance to give the P.Q. authority to separate, the P.Q. has revised its goal and now
seeks "sovereignty-association." Rene Levesque, My Quebec 22 (1979); R. Kenneth Carty
& W. Peter Ward, Entering The Eighties 142-143 (1980); John Saywell, The Rise of the
Parti-Quebecois 1967-1976 (1977). The current P.Q. leader, Jacques Parrzeau, stated that
if his party ousts the liberals in the next provincial election (expected in 1994), his party
would hold a sovereignty referendum within nine months of its election. National Notes,
Sovereignty Timetable, Maclean's, Jan. 4, 1993, at 47.
9. The Bloc Quebecois is a federal political party that is based in and receives
almost all its support from Quebec. This party was formed by Federal Members of
Parliament (M.P.) after the failure of the 1987 attempt to amend the constitution (The
Meech Lake Accord). After the Meech Lake Accord's failure, Bouchard, a Conservative
(one of the three large Canadian political parties) M.P. from Quebec and a member of
Prime Minister Mulroney's cabinet, resigned from his cabinet post and from membership
in the Conservative Party. Bouchard became a hero in Quebec and subsequently became
the leader of the Bloc Quebecois. In a Maclean's/CTV poll, the people of Quebec chose
Bouchard as their favorite federal politician. Bouchard garnered 36% of the votes while
the next three politicians, Brian Mulroney (the Prime Minister and leader of the Federal
Conservative Party), Jean Chretien (leader of the Federal Liberal Party), and Bill Clinton,
garnered 9%, 8%, and 7% respectively. Anthony Wilson-Smith, Time to Listen, Maclean's,
Jan. 4, 1993, at 18; Nancy Ward, A Lion's Roar in Quebec: A Champion of Nationalist
Passion, Maclean's, July 22, 1991, at 19; Anthony Wilson-Smith, A New Voice for
Quebec: Dissident MPs Seek Sovereignty, Maclean's, Oct. 15, 1990, at 22; Bloc Quebecois
to Disband if Quebec Vote Lost, 52 Facts on File 84 (Feb. 6, 1992).
10. The Reform Party of Canada was established in 1987. One year later it garnered
15% of the Alberta vote and 9% of the vote in the western provinces (Manitoba,
Saskatchewan, Alberta, and British Columbia). The party's constitution states it was "born
out of the discontents and frustrated aspirations of Western Canadians." Since its birth,
the Reform Party has also found some support in Ontario and eastern Canada. Gordon
Robertson, A House Divided 7-8 (1989); Brian Bergman, Harvest of Resentment, Ma-
clean's, Oct. 29, 1990, at 37.
11. The Confederation of Regions Party began in a discontented western Canada as
well. However, it is yet to garner substantial support. Paul Kaihla, Anger at the Core,
Maclean's, Oct. 7, 1991, at 16-18.
12. The Meech Lake Accord was a proposed agreement among the provinces and
the federal government to amend the constitution so that Quebec would ratify the con-
stitution. See infra text at note 43.
13. This proposed agreement to amend the constitution followed the failure of the
Meech Lake Accord. See infra text at note 46.
14. Power Share Deal Struck, Winnipeg Free Press (Canada), Aug. 22, 1992, at 10;
Barry Came, A Time for Healing: Emotions Still Divide Oka and Kahnawake, Maclean's,
Nov. 12, 1990, at 26; An Angry Deadlock: There is a No-Surrender Mood at Oka,
Maclean's, Sept. 24, 1990, at 15; Rough Justice, Maclean's, Aug. 6, 1990, at 18.
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or province's interests against those of all other Canadians in order to
gain votes-has also fueled the fire.' 5
Although separatism in Quebec emerged in the middle of this cen-
tury, although some believe its seeds lay on the Plains of Abraham. It
was here that the British forces of General Wolfe defeated the French
forces under General Montcalm, which in turn lead to British rule in
Quebec.', From 1927 until 1982, Quebec blocked the patriation"7 of the
Canadian Constitution." Quebec's blocking actions were based upon the
belief of its people that their distinct society was being eroded by the
dominant English culture of North America and that the patriation of
the constitution, without protection, would accelerate the erosion of that
distinct society. 19 It was not until 1982 that Prime Minister Trudeau
and his Liberal government patriated the Canadian Constitution, with
the assent of all the provinces except Quebec. 20 The Canadian Supreme
Court held that the federal government was not constitutionally required
to obtain the assent of the Canadian provinces to patriate the consti-
tution. However, the Court held that convention does require the federal
government to acquire a "substantial degree" of provincial support.2'
The modern history of Quebec separatism began under the Lesage
government. 22 At the federal-provincial conference of July 1960, the First
15. Alain G. Gagnon & James P. Dickerton, Canadian Politics 285-390 (1990).
16. During the Seven Years War, the English Army and Navy took Quebec in
September, 1759. Four years later, "New France" was transferred to the French under
the Treaty of Paris. John Fitzmaurice, Quebec and Canada 4-5 (1985).
17. Patriation means "bringing back to the home country." In the case of Canada
it also means the termination of the United Kingdom's authority over Canada and Canada's
resulting autonomy. Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada 44-49 (2d ed. 1985).
Peter W. Hogg, Q.C., L.L.B., L.L.M., Ph.D., is a professor of Law at Osgoode Hall
Law School, York University. Professor Hogg's text is the leading text on Canadian
Constitutional Law. Furthermore, Professor Hogg is frequently quoted with approval by
the Supreme Court of Canada.
18. Pierre Trudeau, Trudeau Speaks Out, Maclean's, Sept. 28, 1992, at 23-26.
19. Katherine E. Swinton & Carol J. Rogerson, Competing Constitutional Visions
Part I, 3-93 (1988).
20. Patrick Monahan, Meech Lake: The Inside Story 14-37 (1991).
21. Trudeau, supra note 18, at 22-26. Re Resolution to Amend the Constitution
(Patriation Reference) 1 S.C.R. 753 (1981) [hereinafter Re Resolution To Amend]. This
case is thoroughly discussed by Peter W. Hogg, Comments on Legislation and Judicial
Decisions, 60 Can. Bar Rev. 307 (1982). Conventions are rules of the constitution not
enforced by the courts, but used to prescribe the way in which legal powers shall be
exercised. Hogg, supra note 17, at 12-20.
22. The Liberal Government of Lesage was elected in 1960, and set in motion the
"Quiet Revolution." The "Quiet Revolution" refers to the years of 1960-1966, a period
of dramatic modernization and economic growth in Quebec. Canadian Politics: An In-
troduction to the Discipline 348-49 (Alain Gagnon and James Bickerton eds., 1990); Georges
Mathews, Quiet Revolution 2-9 (1990).
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Ministers discussed a constitutional agreement but failed to produce any
results.23 Later, in 1964, under the pressure of Quebec Nationalists,
Premier Lesage repudiated the Fulton-Favreau Agreement. 4 This agree-
ment was a further attempt to patriate the constitution. After the failure
of the Fulton-Favreau Agreement, "opting out" provisions became the
new demands of the Quebec government.25 These opting out provisions
would allow Quebec to not participate in federal programs, but to receive
federal funds to run their own programs.26 In 1966, Daniel Johnston
became the new premier of Quebec and changed Quebec's demands to
"equality or independence. ' 27
In 1970, the Prime Minister and Premiers agreed to the Victoria
Charter formula which provided for a constitutional amending process. 28
This agreement, as did the Fulton-Favreau Agreement, provided Quebec
with a veto. The agreement required the ratification of all the provinces.
All of the provinces did or were about to provide their ratification when
Quebec decided not to ratify the agreement.2 9
In 1970, the current era of Quebec separatism began. Since then
Quebec has only had two Premiers: Robert Bourassa and Rene Lev-
esque.10 In the autumn of 1970 the short lived radical movement, called
the Front for the Liberation of Quebec (F.L.Q.), kidnapped British
Trade Commissioner James Cross, kidnapped and assassinated Quebec
Labor Minister Pierre Laporte, and caused panic in the streets of Mon-
treal in their search for "freedom."'" In response, Prime Minister Tru-
deau, with the support of the House of Commons, invoked the War
23. Trudeau, supra note 18, at 22-26.
24. The Fulton-Favreau Agreement (1964) set forth a formula that required the
unanimous consent of the Federal Parliament and all provincial Parliaments for all
significant constitutional amendments. Quebec was the only province that did not find
the agreement acceptable, and therefore the agreement was not implemented. Eugene
Forsey, Freedom and Order 235-237 (1972); Hogg, supra note 17, at 54-55.
25. The opting out clause was included in Section 38(3) of the Constitution Act,
1982. A province is permitted to opt out of a constitutional amendment that "derogates
from the legislative powers, the proprietary rights or any other rights or privileges of the
legislature or government of a province." Hogg, supra note 17, at 59-62.
26. Section 40 of the Constitution Act, 1982, provides for "reasonable compensation"
to a province who has opted out of an amendment that transfers "provincial legislative
powers relating to education or other cultural matters" from the provincial to the federal
government. Hogg, supra note 17, at 61.
27. Levesque, supra note 8, at 16-17.
28. Hogg, supra note 17, at 54-56.
29. Id. at 55 n.19.
30. It should be noted that Mr. Levesque has died and that Mr. Bourassa is ill with
cancer. Furthermore, on February 25, 1993, Mr. Mulroney announced his resignation as
Prime Minister. This potential vacuum of powerful leaders leaves Canada's future less
certain. Barry Came, You Never Know, Maclean's, Jan. 25, 1993, at 12; Brenda Dalglish,
Future Vision 1993, Maclean's, Jan. 4, 1993, at 56; Peter C. Newman, Bourassa's Illness
Touches All of Us, Maclean's, Jan. 25, 1993, at 32.
31. Fitzmaurice, supra note 16, at 37-38, 57-58, and 188-89.
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Measures Act, which suspended civil rights and brought the Canadian
military into Quebec to quell the F.L.Q.3 2 After a massive operation,
many key F.L.Q. members were captured and arrested, and the group's
activities ceased. In 1971, Premier Bourassa demanded "cultural-sov-
ereignty." 33 In 1976, Premier Levesque demanded that the rest of Canada
grant Quebec "sovereignty-association" or else Quebec would secede.3 4
In pursuit of these goals Premier Levesque held a referendum in 1980
asking the Quebec people35 for consent to negotiate a separation with
Canada.36 After the referendum's defeat,3 7 Premier Levesque attempted
to achieve Quebec's goals by attempting to induce a shift of federal
power to the provinces. In 1981, Premier Levesque allied himself with
seven other provinces to demand a "notwithstanding" clause, allowing
provinces to opt out of federal programs with compensation. 3 Seven
months later, Premier Levesque conditioned Quebec's assent to patriation
of the constitution by requiring a constitutional veto for Quebec, rec-
ognition of Quebec as a "distinct society," and limitations to the Charter
of Rights and Freedoms. 39 On April 17, 1982, however, Canada patriated
the constitution without Quebec's assent and without its conditions. 40
After the patriation of the constitution in 1982, many Canadians
and Canadian politicians desired that Quebec ratify the constitution.4 '
Once elected to office in 1984, Prime Minister Mulroney adopted this
32. Id. at 37-38 and 189; Hogg, supra note 17, at 285-86.
33. Trudeau, supra note 18, at 24-26.
34. Hogg defines sovereignty-association as secessionL (hence "sovereignty"), but also
having an economic relationship between the ex-province and Canada (hence "associa-
tion"). Hogg, supra note 17, at 101-02. Based upon the demands of the Quebec government
and the public perception of "sovereignty-association," it would appear that the term is
used to describe a state of existence. In this state of existence Quebec would have full
sovereignty, and yet maintain its current economic and military ties (without any changes
to them) with the rest of Canada; see also Fitzmaurice, supra note 16, at 42-50.
35. Quebecois is another term for inhabitants of Quebec. Harrap's New Collegiate
French and English Dictionary 605 (1982).
36. Fitzmaurice, supra note 16, at 42-50.
37. The Quebec referendum had an 85016 voter turnout in which 59.56% voted "no"
and 40.44% voted "yes" to give the Quebec government authority to negotiate a separation
with Canada. Mordecai Richler, Oh Canada! Oh Quebec!: A Requiem for a Divided
Country 124-25 (1992).
38. This was only part of the agreement known as the "Vancouver Formula." Hogg,
supra note 17, at 55. The notwithstanding clause (also known as the override power) is
located in the Constitution Act, 1982, Section 33. A province may override Section 2 or
Sections 7-15 of the constitution. These sections are part of the Charter of Rights. Hogg,
supra note 17, at 15, 259-60 and 690-92.
39. Fitzmaurice, supra note 16, at 295-326.
40. Monahan, supra note 20, at 14-37; Gerald Gall, The Canadian Legal System 64
(3d ed. 1990).
41. Monahan, supra note 20, at 22.
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cause. In 1985, Bourassa returned to power and demanded that the
constitution's preamble be amended to include recognition of Quebec
as a "distinct society." Otherwise he would not participate in consti-
tutional talks which were intended to have Quebec ratify the constitution
and end hostilities among the Canadian Governments.4 2 The Meech Lake
Accord was the product of these talks, which spanned two years. 43
However, when presented to the Canadian public, the Meech Lake
Accord was not popular. Indeed, the Meech Lake Accord became less
popular over time, even though the Federal Government engaged in an
expensive and extensive campaign to promote the Accord." But despite
its unpopularity, the Accord only required Manitoba's assent to progress
to its enactment.4 5 Manitoba did not assent, New Brunswick withdrew
its ratification, and the Meech Lake Accord consequently, failed.
In an effort to salvage Canada, Prime Minister Mulroney successfully
brought the provinces back to the bargaining table. This time, the
negotiations included natives and representatives from the Yukon and
Northwest Territories. The Charlottetown Agreement was the product
of these expanded negotiations. 6 It provided for native self-government, 47
a change to the constitutional amending process 4 and, more importantly,
recognition of Quebec as a "distinct society." ' 49 On October 26, 1992,
42. Swinton & Rogerson, supra note 19, at 3-93.
43. Peter W. Hogg, Meech Lake Constitutional Accord Annotated 3-4 (1988); Bryan
Schwartz, Fathoming Meech Lake 1-3 (1987).
44. Monahan, supra note 20, at 200.
45. Manitoba had a minority Conservative Government. (A minority government in
a parliamentary system of government such as Canada's exists when a political party
holds less than a majority of seats and two or more other parties hold the remaining
seats.) The Manitoba Liberal and the New Democratic Parties held up the Accord because
they were concerned about the effect of the "distinct society" clause on the rights of
women, non-francophones, and natives in Quebec. Nevertheless, the Manitoba Liberal
and New Democratic parties begrudgingly were about to approve the Meech Lake Accord
when one native member of the legislature, Elijah Harper, filibustered past the deadline
for ratification. Harper was a New Democratic Party Member of the Manitoba Legislature.
The actions he took to block the passage of the Meech Lake Accord has made him a
hero to Canadian natives and somewhat of a national hero. Richler, supra note 37, at
218; C.E.S. Franks, The Parliament of Canada 48-50 (1987). The Defeat of the Meech
Lake Accord cannot be mentioned without referring to Premier Clyde Wells of New-
foundland. Wells' vocal campaigning against the Accord and his disputes with pro-Meech
Lake supporters placed him at the forefront of the debate. Philip Resnick, Toward a
Canada-Quebec Union, at 6-9 and 32 (1991).
46. Charlottetown Agreement, § IV, A. [hereinafter Charlottetown Agreement]; Gov-
ernment of Canada, Consensus Report on the Constitution: Charlottetown Agreement
(Aug. 28, 1992) [hereinafter Consensus Report].
47. Charlottetown Agreement, § II, A.
48. Id. § V.
49. Id. § 1, A(2)(l)(c) and 1, A(2)(2).
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all of the Canadian Provinces voted on the Agreement 0 Quebec, British
Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and New Brunswick voted
against its adoption. Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island,
and Ontario (by the narrowest of margins) voted for its adoption."
Thus, the ambitious Charlottetown Agreement, like so many attempted
agreements before it, fell to defeat.
Once again separatism breathes new life. Most assuredly the defeat
of the Charlottetown Agreement will give rise to a stronger movement
for separation in Quebec, the western provinces, and among the First
Nations. It is now, while old wounds fester, that we examine separation's
legal viability. 2
III. THE "RIGHT" TO SEPARATE: COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. The Canadian Constitution
The obvious starting point in determining whether a province, ter-
ritory, or native group can separate in Canada is Canadian Constitutional
Law. Which Constitutional Law? Should it be the Constitutional Law
as set forth by the Constitution Act, 1982, and the subsequent juris-
prudence derived therefrom, even though Quebec did not ratify this
Act? Alternatively, should the law prior to the Constitution Act, 1982,
50. Consensus Report, supra note 46.
51. The following displays how Canadians in the province; and territories voted (yes
is for the adoption of the Charlottetown agreement): Newfoundland 62.9% yes, 36.5%
no; Nova Scotia 48.5% yes, 31.1% no; Prince Edward Island 73.6% yes, 25.9% no; New
Brunswick 61.3% yes, 38% no; Quebec 42.4% yes, 55.4% no; Ontario 49.8% yes, 49.6%
no; Manitoba 37.9% yes, 61.7% no; Saskatchewan 44.5% yes, 55.1% no; Alberta 39.6%
yes, 60.2% no; British Columbia 31.9% yes, 67.8% no; Northwest Territories 60.2% yes,
39% no; Yukon 43.4% yes, 56.1% no; Nationally 44.8% yes, 54.2% no. Anthony Wilson-
Smith, What Happens Next?, Maclean's, Nov. 2, 1992, at 13.
52. The analysis in the above section is not meant to denigrate by omission the
natives and western Canadians who desire to separate. This section is to provide and
explain the original and most dominant impetus for separation in Canada. In a Maclean's/
CTV poll, 69% of Canadians viewed Canada as a relationship among ten equal provinces,
while 31% viewed Canada as a pact between two founding groups, English and French.
Only 56% of Quebecois viewed Canada as a relationship among ten equal provinces,
while 73% of the rest of Canada viewed Canada as a relationship among ten equal
provinces. Allen R. Gregg, The New Canada, Maclean's, Jan. 4, 1993. However weary
Canadians are of the constitutional battles, 79% would not join the United States if given
the opportunity. Interestingly, 20% of Canadians would be willing to join the United
States if given the chance. This is an increase from 1989, when only 16% would be
willing to join the United States. Ross Tarver, Hope In Hard Times, Jan. 4, 1993, at
16-17.
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be applied? It is the constitutional law after the Constitution Act, 1982,
that is the valid and applicable law." The federal government with the
consent of nine provinces, but not Quebec, requested that the United
Kingdom amend the Constitution Act, 1867,' 4 and patriate the Canadian
Constitution."
Three provinces petitioned their Courts of Appeals to determine
whether there was a legal or conventional requirement that the federal
government first obtain the consent of the provinces to patriate the
Canadian Constitution. 6 The provinces' request was then reviewed by
the Supreme Court of Canada. The Supreme Court of Canada held in
Patriation Reference (1981) that the federal government could by law
act unilaterally to patriate the constitution." However, the Supreme
Court did find that convention 8 required the federal government to
obtain a "substantial degree" of provincial support9 Therefore, the
federal government sought and received such consent in December, 1981,
when both Houses of the Canadian Parliament passed the petition which
was subsequently enacted by the Parliament of the United Kingdom and
became the Constitution Act, 1982.60
Nevertheless, to gain a full understanding of the treatment of sep-
aration it is useful to review the prior constitutional law and its approach
to separation. Furthermore, the provisions of the Constitution Act, 1867,
are partially duplicated in the Constitution Act, 1982.
According to Matas, the constitutional law prior to 1982, Quebec
could secede only if the Constitution Act, 1867 was amended. 6' The
necessary amendment could not be enacted by a province or by parlia-
ment; only the British Parliament could enact the amendment. 62 The
53. The largest part of the Constitution of Canada is the Canada Act, 1982. It should
be noted, however, that the Constitution of Canada includes: the Constitution Act, 1982;
the Constitution Act, 1867 and its amendments, also known as the British North America
Act, the orders in council and statutes admitting or creating new provinces or altering
boundaries; the Statute of Westminister, 1931; and the Constitution Amendment Proc-
lamation, 1984.
54. The British North America Act, 1867, an act of the British Parliament, was re-
enacted as the Constitution Act of 1867. Gall, supra note 40, at 61-66.
55. Hogg, supra note 17, at 44-49.
56. Reference re Amendment of Constitution of Canada (Nos. 1, 2, and 3).
57. Re Resolution to Amend, I S.C.R. 753, 848.
58. Hogg, supra note 17, at 12-20.
59. Re Resolution to Amend, I S.C.R. at 848. The Canadian Supreme Court did
not however determine what a "substantial degree" was.
60. Gall, supra note 40, at 63-65; E. McWhinney, Canada and the Constitution 1979-
1982: Patriation of the Charter of Rights 125-26 (1982).
61. David Matas, Can Quebec Separate?, 21 McGill L.J. 387, 389 (1975); R.A.
Mayer, Legal Aspects Of Secession, 3 Man. L.J. 61, 62-66 (1968).
62. The Constitution Act, 1867 could not be generally amended by the Canadian
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procedure to be followed by the British Parliament would have required
a joint address by the Canadian Senate and House of Commons, and
the response of the British Parliament should be only to respect the
wishes of the Federal Parliament.63 No single provincial Parliament could
request such a change, even if an independence referendum was held
and a large majority of the population supported secession.6 The above
conclusion of Matas6" on this issue is essentially the same as later
espoused by the Supreme Court in Patriation Reference."6 In essence,
the pre-1982 analysis is similar to that of post-1982, except that prior
to the patriation of the Canadian Constitution, the United Kingdom's
Parliament had the ultimate and exclusive authority to amend the Canadian
Constitution, this being a British Act of Parliament.
1. By a Province or Territory
One method of separation would be by constitutional amendment
under the Constitution Act, 1982. Peter Hogg, one of Canada's premier
authorities on Constitutional Law, indicates that a province, territory,
or First Nation could constitutionally separate from Canada provided
there was an amendment to the Constitution allowing separation.6 7 Al-
though there are now several ways to amend the constitution-each
method of amending is intended for a specific purpose-section 38, the
general amending procedure, is the most probable procedure to follow
to provide for a separation.6 This procedure requires Federal assent by
both the House of Commons and the Senate as well as the assent of
the legislative assemblies of two thirds of the provinces representing fifty
percent of the population.6 9 A province desiring to secede could not do
so under Section 45 of the Constitution Act, 1982, because secession
would not only amend the constitution of the province, but would also
involve division of the national debt and national property. Section 45
government because it was an act of British Parliament. However, some minor amending
power was given to the Canadian federal and provincial governments. The limited powers
to amend were enumerated in Sections 91(1) and 92(1) for the Canadian federal and
provincial governments respectively. Sections 91(1) and 92(1) have been replaced by Section
44 and 45, respectively, of the Constitution Act, 1982. There are now several amending
procedures that apply to different subject matter and no longer is British assent required.
The amending procedures are discussed infra at note 70.
63. Matas, supra note 61, at 392.
64. Constitution Act, 1867, Sections 91(1) and 92(1). This method had been attempted
by Nova Scotia and failed, see infra text at note 77.
65. Matas, supra note 61, at 403.
66. Re Resolution to Amend, I S.C.R. 753 (1981).
67. Hogg, supra note 17, at 70-73, 101-06.
68. Id. at 102-03.
69. Id.
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only allows a province to amend its provincial constitution and not the
federal constitution. There are other methods of amending the consti-
tution, but they are inapplicable here. o Therefore, a province seeking
to secede cannot do so by a unilateral act.
Separation may be also valid under other procedures than those set
forth in the Constitution Act, 1982. Provincial secession by unilateral
act would, of course, be unauthorized by existing Constitutional Law.7
Nevertheless, a successfully maintained unilateral secession may establish
a new legal order and be considered a successful revolution.7 2
The Common Law has implied that a successful secession by a group
or geographic unit from Canada may be universally recognized as a
legitimate state with the power that accompanies this status. In Mad-
zimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke,"7 the Privy Council "had to decide whether
validity should be accorded to the acts of the legislature and government
of Southern Rhodesia after the 'unilateral declaration of independence'
from Britain." 74 The Privy Council used a two part test and determined
that the acts lacked validity because it "could not be said 'with certainty'
that the breakaway government was in effective control of the territory
which it claimed the right to govern, ' 75 and that the former sovereign,
Britain, still claimed the right to govern. Applying the same analysis as
Madzimbamuto, whether a Canadian province unilaterally declared in-
70. There are five constitutional amending procedures including the Section 38 method.
First, Section 41 provides for unanimity of the Federal Parliament (both the House of
Commons and the Senate) and all the parliaments of each province to amend the con-
stitution when it relates to changing the structure of the Canadian government. However,
it provides for narrow and specific subject areas. These include: the representation in the
House of Commons, the powers of the Senate, selection method for senators, the number
of senators per province, residency of senators, the Supreme Court of Canada, the
extending of provinces into territories, and the establishment of new provinces. Second,
Section 43 provides that when an amendment applies to some but not all of the provinces,
the Federal Parliament and the parliaments of the affected provinces need to assent to
the amendment. Third, Section 44 provides that the Federal Parliament alone need assent
to amendments that are in relation to the Federal Executive, Senate, or House of Commons.
Finally, Section 45 provides each provincial Parliament the power to amend the "con-
stitution of the province." Only Sections 38 and 41 are the potential amending provisions.
The other sections lack the scope. "The indirect impact of secession on matters enumerated
in section 41 makes the unanimity procedure inapplicable." Therefore section 38, which
is the general amending procedure and applies when none of the other four specific
procedures is applicable, is the correct method for amending the Canadian Constitution
to allow for separation. Procedure for Amending the Constitution of Canada, Part V,
Constitution Act, 1982. Hogg, supra note 17, at 58-69, 102-03.
71. Hogg, supra note 17, at 104.
72. The American Revolution and the establishment of the United States as an
independent state, with a new legal order, is one such example.
73. 1 A.C. 645, 3 All E.R. 561 (1968).




dependence, the courts would determine if they could predict with cer-
tainty that the secession would succeed. If -the court determined that
the secession would succeed then the court would determine whether
Canada still claimed a right to govern the secessionist state. Canada's
claim would depend upon the attitude of those in power in the federal
government. The attitude would probably not be accommodating to the
secessionist state if the separation was not by mutual assent of the
federal and secessionist governments, with the support of the Canadian
public.7 6 For these reasons, a secession under the Common Law would
most assuredly fail in Canada, but it is possible.
In fact, secession has already been attempted in Canada. Before the
patriation of the Canadian Constitution in 1868, Nova Scotia petitioned
the Imperial Parliament in 1867 for an amendment to the British North
America Act, 1867 in order to secede from Canada. 7 The request for
the amendment did not come from the federal government, and therefore
the request was denied, despite the fact that two-thirds of the Nova
Scotian voters signed a petition in favor of the secession.78 Even though
this occurred under the Constitution Act, 1867, it sets a negative prec-
edent for any of the current provinces who have aspirations of seces-
sion.79
2. By First Nations
Separation by Native Canadians may soon be accomplished by
amendment to the Canadian Constitution. In fact, the 1992 Charlotte-
town Agreement was intended to amend the constitution and give Ca-
nadian aboriginal peoples the right to self-government. Unfortunately,
the natives fell victim to "power politics" over the dispute between
Quebec and the rest of Canada. All of the proposed changes to the
Canadian Constitution that were proposed in the Charlottetown Agree-
ment were condensed into a one-issue package which the Canadian people
76. This by no means is to suggest that Canada would use military force. Canada
may, however, see fit to use economic and political force. That is, Canada could refuse
to have economic ties with Quebec even though this would economically impair Canada.
Canada could also assert pressure on other countries to do the same. Another method
would be to simply not recognize the new state.
77. See Gall, supra note 40, at 61-66.
78. Matas, supra note 61, at 402 (citing the House of Commons Debates).
79. Should Quebec secede, the prospects of a bloody conflict between Quebec and
the rest of Canada seem remote. The only foreseeable conflict that might arise could be
one between Quebec and the Natives within its territory (the Natives in Quebec could
rightfully claim and request protection from the Federal Canadian Executive). The Mohawk
armed uprising at Oka, Quebec, in the summer of 1989 bears witness of tension between
Quebec and its Native inhabitants. It is interesting that Quebec recognizes its own sov-
ereignty rights but not that of Natives. See supra note 14.
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could either accept or reject as a whole. Each Canadian had one vote,
and even though the results of the national vote were not formally
binding, the Canadian legislatures abided by the results. By doing so
they rejected the Charlottetown Agreement, including self-government
rights for natives, as an amendment to the constitution. 0
It is arguable that self-government is intrinsically incompatible with
the concept of true separation."1 Concededly, some degree of native self-
government would not result in Canadian natives, as a whole or by
group, becoming fully sovereign as we now view the modern sovereign
state.12 It does, however, grant them more sovereign powers than they
currently possess.8 3 Self-government also allows Canadian natives to live
and relate to Canada in a way that is closer to the original intent of
the original treaties between the two parties.14
B. Analogy To the American and Australian Constitutions
The purpose of comparing Canada's Constitution to those of the
United States and Australia is to determine how countries with similar
80. Charlottetown Agreement, supra note 46. See also Your Guide to Canada's
Proposed Constitutional Changes (Canadian government report-Supplement to Charlotte-
town Agreement). The vote was a non-binding referendum, but the surrounding circum-
stances and the portrayal of the agreement resulted in expectations that the politicians
would follow the will of the Canadian public. The federal government was more than
aware that the amendments to appease Quebec were not well received in Western Canada
and even in Quebec, where some of Bourassa's (the Premier of Quebec) top aides said
that he had "sold out" Quebec. Tu Thanh Ha, Wilhemy Tape Gave Juicy Side of Talks
and We Loved It, Montreal Gazette, Oct. 2, 1992, at Al and A2. The vote was predicted
to be close. Why then did Prime Minister Mulroney not make native self-government a
separate issue to be voted upon? It is the opinion of this author that the Prime Minister
acted in this manner to gain the support of the Canadian voter, who approved self-
government for natives but rejected the proposals that were to appease Quebec. Mr.
Mulroney's attempt failed.
81. For instance, the natives would still be dependent on the federal government for
funding and military protection. James Frideres, Native People in Canada 294-312 (2d
ed. 1983).
82. As an example, the natives would concededly not be able to make certain types
of treaties, if any at all. It is unimaginable that the First Nations could make a mutual
defense treaty with Iraq. Meeting the obligations of such a treaty is clearly impossible.
Therefore, under the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States (December
26, 1933) and section 201 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law (1986),
the First Nation fails to meet the statehood criteria of capacity to conduct foreign relations.
See also infra note 123.
83. This is evidenced in the proposals put forth in the Charlottetown Agreement.
See supra note 46. However, is self-government solely restricted to the proposals set forth
in the Charlottetown Agreement? It is yet to be agreed upon exactly what self-government
is and therefore it is still somewhat of a nebulous concept.
84. Natives and Europeans had respect for each other and sought treaties to promote
peaceful co-existence. Olive P, Dickason, Canada's First Nations 275 (1992).
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values, history, and cultures have addressed the potential separation of
one of its peoples and/or political subdivisions.
1. The United States Constitution
The United States and Canada are very similar in their respective
cultural, economic, and geographic structures. Sharing a similar legal
tradition, the two countries each have a written constitution. Those
constitutions establish a federal state85 in each country. This parallel
structure allows for the drawing of valid comparisons.
Neither the United States Constitution nor the Constitution Act,
1982 has any express clause providing that the union is indissoluble and
perpetual . 6 It was only after the American Civil War that the United
States Supreme Court definitively stated the Union was "perpetual,"
"indissoluble," and "indestructible."'"
The United States' experience with secession led to one of the
bloodiest civil wars of history. Unlike Nova Scotia and Western Aus-
tralia, the Confederate States did not seek permission to separate. Each
State, based upon the concept of the states' residual sovereignty to
withdraw from the Union, unilaterally seceded and together formed a
Confederacy. s8
The constitutional justification for the States' withdrawal were the
theoretical concepts of nullification and secession, which had been es-
poused and elaborated upon by John C. Calhoun and Robert Hayne
in their addresses and debates with Daniel Webster. These concepts
gained acceptance, and on December 20, 1860, a convention of the
people of South Carolina adopted an ordinance of secession. This was
followed by a declaration of independence which declared that the union
was dissolved.8 9 The actions of South Carolina were based upon the
assumption that the U.S. Constitution was a compact among the states.
This notion arose from Jefferson's drafting of the Kentucky and Virginia
resolutions, both of which contended that the Union was merely a
compact among the States, that the States had the right to resist any
85. A federal state has a constitutional system of government when the law-making
powers are divided between a central legislative body and legislatures in states or territorial
units making up a federation. The allocation of power is derived from the constitution
and cannot be unilaterally changed by one set of legislators. The Blackwell Encyclopedia
of Political Thought, Federalism, 151 (David Miller ed., 1987).
86. The Australians do have such a clause in the Australian Constitution's Preamble.
See infra text accompanying notes 98-102.
87. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 724-725 (1869).
88. Id. at 725.
89. John S. Bowman, The Civil War Almanac 41 (1982).
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breach of the compact, and also that the States could declare a federal
law as null if it was enacted in excess of the federal powers.1
The States of Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana,
and Texas followed South Carolina's lead. In Montgomery, Alabama,
a Congress of seceding states adopted a constitution similar to that of
the United States and formed a provisional government. 9' In April of
1861, the provisional government directed the confederate militia to
attack Fort Sumnter, which was held by the United States within Con-
federate territory. 92 This was the first act of the American Civil War.
Virginia, Tennessee, North Carolina, and Arkansas then seceded and
joined the Confederacy. In August 1866, after five years of war, the
Union triumphed, the war ended, and the States were united once more.
However, the war ended without a formal amendment that declared the
union of states indissoluble.
These principles of a "perpetual," "indissoluble," and "indestruc-
tible" union were instead set forth in Texas v. White.93 The primary
issue in that case was whether the state of Texas could legitimately pass
an ordinance of secession by legislative act. By virtue of the Texas
ordinance,9 Texas had attempted to cease being a state of the Union,
and therefore its citizens would cease to be citizens of the United States.
The court responded to this attempt by stating:
The union of the States never was a purely artificial and arbitrary
relation .... It received definite form and character and sanction
by the Articles of Confederation. By these the Union was sol-
emnly declared to be "perpetual." And when these Articles were
found to be inadequate to the exigencies of the country the
Constitution was ordained to form a more perfect union. It is
difficult to convey the idea of indissoluble unity more clearly
than by these words. 95
It is in this language that the Constitution of the United States
90. Id. at 13; Thomas Jefferson 125-26 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1986); Caleb P.
Patterson, The Constitutional Principles of Thomas Jefferson 55-56 and 149-55 (1953).
91. Bowman, supra note 89, at 42-46.
92. Id. at 50-51.
93. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 724-25 (1869). The U.S. Supreme Court found that
Texas did not cease to be a State nor her citizens to be citizens of the Union. It is noted
by the Australians, Quick and Garran, that the victorious union did not propose an
amendment to expressly state the perpetuity and indissolubility of the union. To do so,
say the Australians, "after it had been so settled by the sword," would be tantamount
to admitting doubt existed. John Quick & Robert Randolph Garran, The Annotated
Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth 294 (1976).
94. The Texas ordinance was adopted on February 1, 1861. White, 74 U.S. at 704.
95. Id. at 724-725.
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denies the right to secession and ensures an indestructible union of
states. However, the Supreme Court went on to state that: "ITihe
perpetuity and indissolubility of the Union by no means implies the loss
of distinct and individual existence or of the right of self-government
by the States .... [Tihe Constitution in all its provisions looks to an
indestructible union composed of indestructible States."' ' Thus, the states
were independent to a degree, and they too were free from a threat of
secession by a sub-component.
In Texas v. White,97 the United States Supreme Court held that the
union of the states was "perpetual" and "indissoluble." Therefore the
Court reasoned that the confederate states could not and did not secede.
Thus, the theories of secession and nullity, based upon Jefferson's
assumption that the United States Constitution was a compact among
states, failed. The Supreme Court's decision did not occur until after
a bloody civil war. Canada, as the United States, does not have an
express clause in its constitution asserting that the state is perpetual and
indissoluble. Hopefully, the Canadian Supreme Court has the opportunity
to declare that Canada is "perpetual" and "indissoluble" before Canada
is confronted with a group that attempts to separate.
2. The Australian Constitution
The Australian Constitution (July 9, 1900) specifically precludes
separation in its preamble. The preamble affirms that the people of
Australia have agreed "to unite in one indissoluble Federal Common-
wealth." 8 It is the opinion of the Australian jurists John Quick and
Robert Garran that the omission of such a clause in the United States
Constitution led to doctrines of nullification, secession, and ultimately
the American Civil War.9 This is what the Australian constitutional
framers hoped to avoid.
The Australians also realized that the Canadians did not have a
clause declaring perpetuity or indissolubility in the Constitution Act,
1867. However, the Australians apparently understood that what was
96. Id. at 725.
97. Id.
98. The Preamble to the Australian Constitution states in part: "Whereas the people
of New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Queensland, and Tasmania, humbly
relying on the blessing of Almighty God, have agreed to unite in one indissoluble Federal
Commonwealth under the Crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland,
and under the Constitution hereby established." The Commonwealth of Australia Con-
stitution Act, 63 and 64 VICT., Chapter 12 (July 9, 1900) (emphasis added). Id.
99. Quick & Garran, supra note 93, at 292; see also R.D. Lumb and K.W. Ryan,
The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia Annotated (3d ed. 1981); Peter J.
Hanks, Australian Constitutional Law (4th ed. 1985).
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good for Canada was not necessarily good for Australia. The Australians
had the benefit of the experience and analysis of the American Civil
War, while Canada did not. Furthermore, the Canadian colonial ex-
perience lasted 300 years and was a cultural mosaic, while Australia
was settled simultaneously and was largely homogeneous. Finally,
Canadian political organization was regionally based while Australian
parties worked on a national level. For these reasons, the Australians
believed that there should be a reminder of the intent of the "framers"
to create a lasting and indissoluble state.
Despite the precautions taken by the Australian constitutional fram-
ers, Australia, like Canada and the United States, has already experienced
an attempted separation. In 1935 the state of Western Australia tried
to separate from the Australian Commonwealth.' °0 Until reform in 1986,
Australia continued and made necessary a practice of petitioning the
United Kingdom to approve and to effect Australian law reform. 01
Thus, Western Australia petitioned a joint committee of the House of
Lords and the House of Commons of the United Kingdom. 0 2 Even
though approximately two-thirds of the Western Australians voted to
separate, 03 the request was denied on the same basis given regarding
the earlier attempt by Nova Scotia-the request did not come from the
federal government.'0 4 Thus, the Australian experience indicates that
separation without the consent of the federal government will not suc-
ceed.
In order to separate under Canadian constitutional law, there must
be an amendment to the Constitution Act, 1982, as provided for in
section 38, allowing such a separation. The Confederate American states,
Western Australia, and Nova Scotia are examples of how federal gov-
ernments have resisted such separations and do not provide any support
for separatist groups in Canada. The common law principles put forth
in Madzimbamuto'o' may offer a shred of hope for separatists. This
100. Matas, supra note 61, at 392; Mayer, supra note 61, at 63-64.
101. Australia was bound to petition the United Kingdom by the Colonial Laws Validity
Act, 1865. Hogg, supra note 17, at 94-95; Hanks, supra note 99, at 11-13.
102. Report to consider the petition of the State of Western Australia (House of
Commons (U.K.), Parliamentary Papers, vol. 6 (1934-35)).
103. Matas, supra note 61, at 402; Mayer, supra note 61, at 63. The number of
people that voted for secession in Western Australia is significant in that the prerequisite
support of two-thirds of the people was not sufficient to procedurally override the
established constitutional process. Thus Quebec's 1980 referendum and any future ref-
erendum is simply an indicator of support for separation. Under the West Indies Act,
1967, C.4 (U.K.) a West Indian state associated with the U.K. could terminate the
association with a two-thirds vote of the legislature of one of these states. Then a
referendum would be required with a two-thirds vote in support of termination. If the
referendum approves termination, then royal assent is given. Matas, supra note 61, at
388.
104. Matas, supra note 61, at 392; Mayer, supra note 61, at 63-64.
105. Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke, [1968] 1 A.C. 645.
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hope is ill-founded, however, because a separating group would probably
never meet the requirement of receiving assent from the former sovereign,
Canada. The only exception to this may be the natives, who seek self-
government and not a thorough separation from Canada. Finally, a
separating group may become a valid state if they successfully establish
a new order with a new legal standard. 106 It is this last mode of separation
that is best addressed by international law.107
IV. THE "RIGHT" TO SEPARATE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
International law may provide both a right to separate and a jus-
tification for such a separation, whereas Canadian constitutional law
provides no such opportunities. Customary international law and treaty
law are equally useful in setting forth guidelines which separating parties
in Canada could follow. Prior to inquiring whether international law
can be applied to the issue, it is important' to understand how it is
implemented in concert with Canadian constitutional law.
A. The Role of International Law in the Canadian Scheme
The Federal Government of Canada exercises exclusive treaty-making
powers. The Canadian Parliament need not be involved in the process.
International relations have always been a prerogative of the Crown,
the executive branch. Treaties that require ratification and are considered
important are usually presented to both the House of Commons and
the Senate for approval. One quarter of the treaties that Canada ratified
between 1946 and 1966 were submitted to Parliament. Once ratified,
the treaty is binding in international law but it is not effective internally
in Canada until it is implemented.108 Implementation of a treaty requires
enactment of a statute in order to give the treaty domestic effect.1°9
Customary international law, however, may be effected as part of the
Common Law. Customary international law or a treaty that is not
implemented may be persuasive to a Canadian court but is not binding.
Section 132 of the Constitution Act, 1867 which provides the au-
thority for internal implementation of international law, reads: "The
106. It is not, however, wholly inconceivable that Canadian politicians will strike a
new deal that may include the rewriting of the constitution. This would be a means of
maintaining a sense of Canada as it is today.
107. Application to the United Nations or International Court of Justice may be the
last resort for Canada to resolve its internal disputes. These international organizations
and international decisions may become more prevalent if the world continues to shift
power traditionally residing with the states to international or supernational organizations.
108. Hogg, supra note 17, at 241-46.
109. Id. at 243-44.
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Parliament and Government of Canada shall have all powers necessary
or proper for performing the obligations of Canada or of any province
thereof, as part of the British Empire, towards foreign countries, arising
under treaties between the empire and such foreign countries." 110 The
framers of this clause of the Constitution Act, 1867 obviously did not
foresee Canada becoming an independent nation. Instead, they viewed
Canada as part of the British Empire, and as such, would have its
major treaties signed by the British Crown. The Imperial Conference
of 1926 affirmed that Canada was autonomous in both domestic and
international affairs. Therefore, Canada had full and exclusive authority
to conduct its own international affairs.
In Labour Conventions,"' the Privy Council interpreted section 132
as authorizing part of the British Empire (Canada) to implement British
treaties, and found that power to implement treaties was set forth in
Sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.112 "[I]n classifying a
statute which was required to implement a Canadian Treaty, one was
supposed to disregard the fact that the purpose of the statute was to
implement a treaty and to look to the substantive matter of the stat-
ute.""' 3 That is, if the matter was allocated by section 91 to the Federal
Parliament, the Federal Parliament had the power to implement the
statute. Conversely, if section 92 allocated the power to the Provincial
Legislature, it had the power to implement the statute. 1 4 The Labour
Conventions case and its poor reasoning have been heavily criticized" 5
for being contrary to the spirit and possibly the literal language of
section 132. Furthermore, it renders the government of Canada powerless
to ensure performance of treaties it has signed." 6 However, it should
be noted that provincial autonomy would be threatened if the federal
government could derogate from the powers allocated to the provinces
in section 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867. Furthermore, Hogg has
noted that the United States and Australia, countries where the federal
governments retain treaty-making power, are still constrained by internal
political considerations that result in their behaving similarly to Canada
in international affairs.' 7
110. Can. Const. § 132 (1867).
111. A.G. Canada v. A.G. Ontario et al. (Labour Conventions) (1937) A.C. 326
[hereinafter A.G. Can. v. A.G. Ont.].
112. Id. at 462-65.
113. Hogg, supra note 17, at 251.
114. This is an example of the "water tight compartments" principle. However, since
Multiple Access v. McCutcheon, 2 S.C.R. 161 (1982), this principle is no longer a proper
guide for judicial attitudes towards Canadian Constitutional Law. Bruce Ryder, The Demise
and Rise of the Classical Paradigm in Canadian Federalism: Promoting Autonomy for
the Provinces and First Nations, 36 McGill L.J. 309 (1991); Hogg, supra note 17, at 251,
341; Gall, supra note 40, at 99.
115. A.G. Can. v. A.G. Ont. (1937) A.C. 326.
116. Hogg, supra note 17, at 252-54.
117. Id. at 254.
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The case of Radio Reference"' saw the Privy Council accept the
argument that the Federal Parliament had power under the principles
of peace, order, and good government" 9 to implement a Canadian treaty.
If a law relates to a treaty, section 132 does not apply and if it is not
enumerated in sections 91 or 92 then section 91 applies the residual
power of the Federal Government of Canada to make laws for
peace, order, and good government. 2 0 Peace, order, and good govern-
ment is meant to fill the gaps in the Canadian scheme of distribution
of powers. 2 ' Although this reasoning on the implementation was rejected
in the Labour Conventions case, Hogg recognizes that recent dicta of
the Supreme Court of Canada suggest that the reasoning of the Radio
Reference case may again become favored.12 Therefore, "peace, order,
and good government" may prevail and, if the case does not become
favored, we need to determine whether the treaty subject matter has
been allocated to the Federal or provincial Parliaments.
B. The International Law of Separation and Self-Determination
How does international law determine whether a separating province
has become an independent state? First it must meet the requirements
as set out by the 1933 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties
of States.1 23 The Montevideo Convention and Restatement § 201 both
require that a state have a defined territory, permanent population,
118. Re Regulation and Control of Radio Communication in Canada (Radio Reference)
(1932) A.C. 304, at 312.
119. Gall, supra note 40, at 93, 96-98; Hogg, supra note 17, at 369-95.
120. Hogg, supra note 17, at 369.
121. Id. at 373.
122. Id.
123. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 201 (1986):
b. Defined territory. An entity does not necessarily cease to be a state even if
all of its territory has been occupied by a foreign power, it has boundary
disputes or if it has otherwise lost control of its territory temporarily.
c. Permanent population. To be a state an entity must have a population that
is significant and permanent.
d. Government. A state need not have any particular form of government, but
there must be some authority exercising governmental functions and able to
represent the entity in international relations.
e. Capacity to conduct international relations. An entity is not a state unless
it has competence, within its own constitutional system, to conduct international
relations with other states, as well as the political, technical and financial
capabilities to do so.
The Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States (Dec. 26, 933) sets forth
the same criteria as above mentioned section 201. Barry E. Carter & Phillip R. Trimble,
International Law 413 (1991).
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government, and the capacity to conduct foreign relations. Recognition
of a state is a controversial process, and several legal theories exist that
describe a state's creation.'1 The constitutive theory of international law
suggests an entity is not a state unless recognized by other states. One
state is under no duty to recognize another state. Therefore, this theory
must only be considered as one factor in determining statehood. The
declaratory theory, also known as the evidentiary theory, is in opposition
to the constitutive approach. This theory declares that statehood exists
prior to recognition and that recognition is merely a formal acceptance
of that statehood. Under either theory, recognition of a state acknowl-
edges that as an entity, it has the privileges, rights, and duties of a
state.1 25 The American Restatement of Foreign Relations Law suggests
international entities should be treated as states even if these entities
are not formally recognized as states. Restatement section 202 states this
principle does not apply if "statehood" results from a threat or use of
armed force in violation of the United Nations Charter.1 26
Self-determination has only recently become a prominent concept in
international law. Significantly, although international law supports the
right to self-determination it, like most states, is reluctant to support a
secession. 27 This reluctance may reflect states' fear of legitimizing se-
cession, which in turn could lead to legitimizing secession attempts in
their own states.
Past questions of self-determination gave way to machtpolitik: either
armed force was used to put down a rebellion or a strong and successful
rebellion resulted in a new state or government. 2 However, machtpolitik
may be losing ground to negotiated separations. Peaceful and not very
peaceful separations of colonies since World War II, and more impor-
tantly the usually peaceful division and sub-division of the Soviet sphere,
have set the stage for a new era of Nationalism and separation. It may
be a fleeting trend, as the experiences of South Africa 29 or the former
124. Sharon Williams, International Legal Effects of Secession by Quebec 4 (Final
Report of the York University Constitutional Reform Project, Study No. 8, 1992).
125. Id. at 4-5.
126. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law 204, Reporters Note 2 (1986).
127. Williams, supra note 124, at 18-19, 22.
128. Machtpolitik is the German term for power politics. It is the conducting of politics
entirely as if there was no other factor involved besides power, and groups are only
considered to the extent they have power. Roger Scruton, A Dictionary of Political
Thought, 280, 357 (1982).
129. Johan D. Van Der Vyver, Constitutional Options For Post-Apartheid South Africa,
40 Emory L.J. 745 (1991); Chris Erasmus, On the Brink of Disaster, Maclean's, July 13,
1992, at 24; John Bettershy, Attack Marks Shift in South African Violence, The Christian
Sci. Monitor, Dec. 1, 1992, at 3; Joseph Contreras, Slaughter in South Africa, Newsweek,
Sept. 21, 1992, at 57.
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Yugoslavia130 would suggest, or a sign of things to come. Hopefully this
new trend of peaceful separation has rooted itself and will continue as
the preferred form of division of the modern state.
The following analysis of self-determination relates to a Canadian
province, territory, and Native peoples in reference to international law
and Canadian constitutional law.
1. Quebec (As a Province)
Quebec has traditionally been the province in Canada that has sought
its own independence. Under international law, Quebec also has the best
claim of any of the Canadian provinces for true self-determination. For
these reasons, Quebec will be analyzed in the following discussion to
determine whether a Canadian province has the right to self-determi-
nation under international law.
Self-determination was first presented in international law during the
1920s in the Aaland Islands Case. The people of these islands wished
to separate from Finland and become a part of Sweden.13' Self-deter-
mination did not, however, receive serious consideration until after World
War II. Over time the "legal" right of self-determination has developed
to apply only to "peoples."' ' The right of self-determination is expressed
in Article 1(2) of the Charter of the United Nations. Canada, as a
signatory to the Charter of the United Nations, is bound under inter-
national law to apply Article 1(2). This article states that the purpose
of the United Nations is "to develop friendly relations among nations
based on the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peo-
ples."' 33 Article 55 of said Charter reiterates this concept. 3 4 Canada is
also bound to the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political
130. Richard F. Iglar, The Constitutional Crisis in Yugoslavia and The International
Law of Self-Determination: Slovenia's and Croatia's Right to Secede, 15 BCICLR 213
(1993); Louise Lief & Tim Zimmerman, Clinton and the World, U.S. News and World
Rep., Feb. 22, 1993, at 33; Robin Knight, A Test the West is Failing, U.S. News and
World Rep., Jan. 18, 1993, at 56; Eloise Salholz, Of Diplomats and Lame Ducks,
Newsweek, Nov. 16, 1992, at 46. These articles are just examples of many that saturated
western media at the end of 1992 and early months of 1993.
131. The inhabitants of the Aaland Islands were unsuccessful in their bid. Williams,
supra note 124, at 13.
132. Id. at 14.
133. U.N. Charter, Ch. I: Purposes and Principles, art. 1 (2). See also Barry E. Carter
& Philip R. Trimble, International Law: Selected Documents 24 (1991).
134. U.N. Charter, Ch. IX, art. 55: "With a view to the creation of conditions of
stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among
nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples,
the United Nations shall promote .... See Carter & Trimble, supra note 133, at 14.
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Rights and Cultural Rights which adopted the "right" to self-determi-
nation for all peoples.135 As set out by these treaties and other sources
of international law, self-determination allows these "peoples" to freely
determine their political status.
U.N. Security Council Resolutions, General Assembly Resolutions,
the Covenants, World Advisory Opinions, and Multicultural Treaties
that espouse self-determination indicate that self-determination has be-
come an international right. 36 This "right" however, has only been used
in limited situations of colonial devolution. Sharon Williams noted that
"it has not been forcefully argued when the struggle has begun after
independence. '1 37 The 1970 Declaration of Principles supports this view:
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as au-
thorizing or encouraging any action that would dismember or
impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political
unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves
in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-deter-
mination of peoples as described above, and thus possessed of
a government representing the whole people belonging to the
territory without distinction as to race, creed, or color.'
Genevieve Burdeau, of the Belanger-Campeau Commission,' 39 deems
135. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess.,
Supp. No. 16, Part 1, art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right
they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic,
social and cultural development.
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth
and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international
economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and inter-
national law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of
subsistence.
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having re-
sponsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories,
shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination, and shall respect
that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United
Nations.
See also id. at 357-72.
136. Examples of these documents that espouse self-determination are: the 1970 Dec-
laration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.S. Res. 2625
(XXV), 25 UN GAOR, Supp. No. 28, at 121; U.N.S.C. Res. 183 (1963); U.N.S.C. Res.
301 (1971); U.N.S.C. Res. 377 (1975); Declaration on Friendly Relations, G.A. Res. 2625,
Annex, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17), at 66, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1970); Declaration
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.S. Res. 1514
(XV), 14 December 1960; Namibia Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Rep. 1971, at 31; Western
Sahara Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Rep. 1975, at 12 and 31-33.
137. Williams, supra note 124, at 16.
138. Id.
139. After the failure of the Meech Lake Accord, the Belanger-Campeau Commission
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two things necessary for provincial secession outside of a colonial sit-
uation that will assure compliance with international law. ,40 Both popular
will and the consent of the predecessor state are required under Burdeau's
approach. These criteria lend themselves to colonial devolution but not
to unilateral separation (e.g. secession) without consent by the prede-
cessor state. The experience of Eastern Europe has seen the consent of
the former Soviet Union and then Russia for its component parts to
separate. Canada's consent would therefore appear to be required and
possibly not forthcoming.
The other basis that Quebec as a province may assert in its claim
to self-determination is that it is a "people" in the context of inter-
national law.' 4 1 The standard of "people" has both objective and sub-
jective aspects. The subjective standard is whether a latge majority of
the subject group views itself as a "people" distinct from other peoples,
both within the same sovereignty and with respect to other "peoples"
in the world. 142 The standard most certainly is aided if these people
view themselves as sovereign. The objective standard is based upon
whether there are common identifying characteristics within the group,
such as geographic, ethnic, linguistic, religious, economic, or historical
bonds. 143
Quebec meets part of the subjective standard. Quebecois view them-
selves as distinct from other Canadians.'" Quebec's insistent desire to
have recognition in the Canadian Constitution as a distinct society within
Canada is evidence of this. However, the failed 1980 referendum on
sovereignty and the concomitant desire for sovereignty-association are
admissions by Quebec that as yet it does not view itself fully sovereign.
Quebecois also seem to meet the objective standards of "people"
in the context of international law. The Quebecois live in the geographic
area defined by the province of Quebec. Unfortunately, other French
Canadians live in pockets across the maritime provinces, Ontario, and
the Prairie Provinces. These, therefore, do not meet the geographic
standard except on a community by community basis. It could be argued
however, that these other French Canadians, or French Canadians as a
whole, do meet these standards. In what was formerly the Soviet Union,
was created by the Quebec National Assembly (the provincial legislature) and the Allaire
Committee was created by the Quebec Liberal Party to formulate a new position for
Quebec. Monahan, supra note 20, at 261-62.
140. Williams, supra note 124, at 17.
141. Iglar, supra note 130, at 214.
142. Williams, supra note 124, at 14-15, 19.
143. Id.
144. This includes being distinct from French Canadians not from or residing in Quebec.
Richard Handler, Nationalism and the Politics of Culture in Quebec 30-38 (1988).
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pockets of Russians are dispersed throughout this territory. Surely no
one would deny that they would qualify as a "people." However, only
some French Canadians outside Quebec view themselves as Quebecois.
Those who do were probably born in Quebec or at some time lived
there. Therefore, the objective and subjective standards in concert nec-
essarily determine that the vast majority of French Canadians living
outside of the borders of Quebec are not Quebecois.
Quebecois belong to an ethnic French group. However, the French
Canadian ethnic group has subcategories such as Metis, Franco-Ontar-
ians, Franco-Manitobains, New Brunswick French, and possibly sub-
divisions within Quebec itself (e.g., metropolitan Montreal compared to
the region of Gaspe). 45 The Quebecois have also intermingled with
English, Natives, and other ethnic groups.' 46 Therefore, ethnicity can
only be argued on the broad standard of French, which is based more
upon language and self identification in the Canadian context. Quebec's
dominant French language is unquestionably a primary unifying factor.
The Quebecois' primary language is French, and its maintenance
has been safeguarded by many governmental and non-governmental ac-
tions. The Quebec Government has even exercised the powers granted
to it by the Canadian Constitution and instituted language laws to exclude
commercial and educational use of all other languages. 147 Although
support of religion is varying across Canada, Quebec remains predom-
inantly Roman-Catholic. 14 The Quebec economy as a political unit unites
all Quebecois in its prosperity or weakness.
Historically Quebec has been a separate entity from the rest of
Canada. It began as a colony of France and then became a British
colony after the British conquest. Quebec thereafter became part of the
Canadian Confederation. Although Quebec was seen .as separate com-
munity; it was never an independent state and therefore cannot be
distinguished on these grounds. Quebec may however be distinguished
as the primary residence of the coming together of two peoples, English
and French. 49
145. Jean Leonard Elliott, Two Nations Many Cultures, 99-152 (1979); Dean R. Louder
& Eric Waddell, French America 1-116 (1983); Edward M. Corbett, Quebec Confronts
Canada 84-88 (1967).
146. Dickason, supra note 84, at 168-73; Frideres, supra note 81, at 271-92.
147. In 1977 the Parti Quebecois enacted Bill 101 in Quebec. This law was to prohibit
the use of English on most commercial signs (among other things). There were challenges
to this law which was later to be found unconstitutional. See Devine v. A.G. Quebec, 2
S.C.R. 790 (1988) and Ford v. A.G. Quebec, 2 S.C.R. 712 (1988). In 1981, Premier
Robert Bourassa invoked override provisions in the Canadian Charter (section 33) and
Quebec Charter of Rights to prohibit the use of any language but French on commercial
signs. This was enacted under Bill 178. lan Greene, The Charter of Rights 106 (1989).
148. Corbett, supra note 145, at 84.
149. Fitzmaurice, supra note 16, at 1-75. The concept of coming together of two
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There are other considerations used to determine whether the Que-
becois are a people. A homogeneous group with a wish to govern
themselves is simply not enough. Colonial rule and alien domination
are factors to be considered in whether a "people" are able to effect
self-determination as prescribed by international law. It would not be
logical to consider the people of Quebec subject to colonial rule or alien
domination. Quebecois have the same rights as all Canadians and the
province of Quebec is one of ten, together with the two territories that
comprise Canada. There are some in Quebec that would argue, based
primarily on emotion that their rights are under attack from a dominant
English Canada. Quebec's position is not, however, what would normally
be considered a colony or ruled by an outside force. Quebec has full
representation and participation in the Canadian System and has not
been treated "unfairly" or as a non-self governing unit. There has not
been functional subjugation or disenfranchisement. Furthermore, the
province of Quebec has the same rights and governing ability ag the
other Canadian provinces. It aids the "peoples' case if a "people" is
located in an identifiable geographic area.
If Quebecois are a "people" as prescribed by international law, then
is each ethnic group in Canada that dwells in a geographically defined
area to be considered a "people"? The differences between Quebecois
and other Canadian ethnic groups are that the Quebecois have repre-
sentation through a provincial government, their language is one of
Canada's national languages and further their cohesion and numbers
give them greater political power than other groups. Therefore, if self-
determination is a right under international law, then Quebec has the
international legal right of self-determination.
2. Territories
Canada and its relationship with the Yukon and Northwest Terri-
tories cannot be properly compared to the United States and its rela-
tionship with Puerto Rico and the former Trust Territory of the Pacific.
Islands (Marshall Islands, Palau, Northern Mariana Islands, and the
Federated States of Micronesia) in regards to the concept of separation.
This is largely based on the fact that the Canadian Territories are more
integrated than are the territories of the United States. Obviously the
relationships are more complex than this, but for the purpose of analysis,
this study focuses solely on the ability to separate.
peoples is an eighteenth century concept that has carried over to the current day. The
two peoples are the English and French, who have their languages as the official languages
of Canada. McWhinney, supra note 60, at 3-7. Canada's natives, technically the first
people, are offended by this notion.
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Canadian and American territories alike have territorial governments,
but American territories have constitutions whereas the Canadian ter-
ritories do not.'50 Puerto Rico and the Pacific Islands acquisition were
the result of victory in war.' Persons in the American territories are
citizens of the United States. However, the "Americans" in the territories
do not have all of the constitutional rights that mainlander and Hawaiian
Americans have. 5 2
In Canada's territories, Canadian citizens have the same constitu-
tional rights as Canadians in the provinces. Puerto Rico has a resident
Commissioner in the House of Representatives (since 1904), who can
speak in Congress and Committee, introduce legislation, and vote in
the Committees to which he is elected; but he cannot vote on the House
Floor.' 3 The Pacific Islands do not have representatives in Congress as
does Puerto Rico. 54 The Canadian territories have members of Parlia-
ment to represent them in the House of Commons but do not have
Senate or Supreme Court representation.' The Northern Mariana Islands
and Puerto Rico have the status of Commonwealth, and the other U.S.
Pacific territories have agreements with the United States for military
protection and economic assistance, and for this reason, have given up
power to conduct their foreign affairs. 5 6 The Canadian territories have
no such agreement because they are considered part of the Canadian
whole and therefore they are subordinate to the Canadian Federal Gov-
ernment in the area of foreign affairs. In summary, the American
territories have acted semi-autonomous, and the control of the American
Federal Government has been, relatively speaking, at arms length. On
the other hand, the Canadian Federal Territories have been integrated
and are under greater Federal control.
Analyzing both American and Canadian territories under interna-
tional law, it is evident that both lack the capacity to conduct inter-
national relations, and are therefore not states.' 5 7 The diversity in the
150. Carter & Trimble, supra note 133, at 434, 436-37.
151. Puerto Rico was ceded to the United States by Spain in 1898 as a result of the
Spanish-American War. The U.S. Pacific Islands have been administered by the United
States since 1947 pursuant to a U.N. strategic Trustee Agreement, after the U.S. wrestled
the territory from the Japanese. Previously, Japan administered the Islands under a post
World War I League of Nations Mandate. Carter and Trimble, supra note 123, at 433,
436. The Canadian territories were peacefully joined to Canada. Hogg, supra note 17,
at 31-32.
152. Carter and Trimble, supra note 133, at 433, 436. For example, Puerto Ricans
cannot vote for president, and Mariana Labor regulations are less stringent.
153. Id. at 434.
154. Id. at 436.
155. Hogg, supra note 17, at 168, 201.
156. Carter & Trimble, supra note 133, at 433-37.
157. See Montevideo Convention of 1933 and Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
Law § 201 (1986). See also supra note 111.
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Yukon and possibly the Northwest Territories does not allow the regions
to come under the international concept of "people." ' However, the
larger number of Inuit in the Canadian Territories may qualify as a
"people." Puerto Ricans as a whole, and Micronesian groups (or as a
whole), can more easily be found as a "people." Furthermore, under
international law it appears as if a group only needs the consent of the
predecessor state and the will of the people to have a successful sep-
aration. The official position of the United States is that Puerto Rico
has a right to self-determination and independence. 59 Puerto Ricans have
yet to assert their will. The United States has yet to assert its consent
to the Pacific territories just as Canada has not yet asserted its consent
for its territories to separate. Thus, it appears Puerto Rico is the only
territory that has a chance in the near future to become a sovereign
state.
3. First Nations'0
Self-government by native peoples in both America and Canada
appears to be inherent under international law. Natives in both the
United States and Canada meet the subjective standard of viewing them-
selves as a distinct ethnic group separate from other groups in Canada
and abroad. However, this self-government concept is not without its
complications. It is probable that the Inuit,'61 Metis, 62 and other native
groups view themselves as being distinct from one another. This analysis
also applies to most natives' beliefs that they were originally and are
now sovereign. It is difficult to determine which groups believe themselves
to be sovereign. However, the use and application of the term "First
Nations" indicates that each nation is separate and therefore possibly
sovereign.
158. These regions do not meet the criteria as set forth by International Law. For
example the regions do not subjectively identify themselves as a "people" in the manner
set forth in International Law.
159. Carter & Trimble, supra note 133, at 434.
160. The term native is used in two manners in this analysis: 1) as the entire group
of Canadian aboriginal peoples in Canada and 2) as the group of aboriginal peoples
distinct from the Metis and Inuit.
161. The Inuit are aboriginal people that live in Canada's northern extremities. They
are different both in culture and language from other aboriginal peoples in Canada. These
people are often mistakenly called eskimo. Frideres, supra note 81, at 12-13.
162. Traditionally the Metis are a group of people that are culturally and ethnically
both native and French, Scottish, or English. The Metis are distinct culturally, ethnically,
and by language from other groups in Canada. Historically, they have also played a large
role in the formation of Canada. In 1885, some Metis under their leader, Louis Riel,
attempted to separate from Canada. The North-West Rebellion (as it is called in Canadian
texts) was put down when the Metis were crushed by Canadian soldiers at Batoche,
Saskatchewan. Id. at 12; George Stanley, Louis Riel 324-39 (1963).
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The objective standards required to be a "people" also appear to
be met by the Canadian Natives, Metis, and Inuit. Geographically, a
large number of natives live in reserves.1 63 These reserves are dispersed
across both the United States and Canada. This dispersion appears to
be acceptable for meeting the objective standard, except when one such
"nation" is divided among different reservations.' Natives may argue
the First Nations' division was caused by the federal government and
therefore the division should not affect their meeting the objective stan-
dard.
Culturally, natives have been under attack from the contrasting,
dominant European culture. It may be difficult to separate natives
beyond Metis, Inuit, and Natives in relation to ethnicity. The languages
of the natives are as numerous as are First Nations. Unfortunately,
these languages have given way to English and French, the dominant
national languages. Some First Nations do, however, persist in main-
taining their own languages. 65 Religion among Natives is also varied.
Some Natives retain or have returned to their native religions while
others have embraced European religions, primarily Christian denomi-
nations.'16 The various religious beliefs are a weak and probably in-
consequential link for the natives in their assertion as a "people." The
economy of the Natives is closely tied to the federal governments in
the United States and Canada. They have become heavily dependant
upon government funds to operate the reserves. 167
Finally, from a historical perspective, the North American natives
have always been treated as a different group of people in comparison
to the Europeans who came to forge a New World. The Europeans
(usually British) made treaties with the Natives as sovereigns. However,
this became a hinderance to European expansion and the quest for
Europeanization of North America; therefore, the view of natives as
sovereign lost popularity. This led to fewer treaties and the breaking of
past treaties. To the Europeans of the time, this made perfect sense.
The natives were conquered or could not match the military power of
the new North Americans, and so they had to submit to the white
man's rule. Recently, a movement has developed in North America to
163. Dickason, supra note 84, at 418.
164. For example, the Mohawks are dispersed in different reservations in Canada (e.g.,
Kahnewake, Chateauguay) as well as different countries (the U.S and Canada). Although
this does not preclude their claim that they are one people, it does weaken it. Scott Reid,
Canada Remapped: How the Partition of Quebec Will Reshape the Nation 121-23 and
129-33 (1992); Rick Hornung, One Nation Under the Gun, VIII, 77-79 (1991).
165. Dickason, supra note 84, at 145-46.
166. Id. at 146.
167. Frideres, supra note 81, at 294-312.
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honor past treaties, grant self-government, and return some, if not all,
of the land that was taken in violation of past treaties. 68 This new
perspective implies a respect or recognition of native sovereignty once
more.
Natives in Canada meet both the subjective and objective standards
set forth by the international law principle of self-determination. The
Canadian government's support of the natives, as evidenced by the
Charlottetown Agreement, and the support of the Canadian public imply
that in the near future Canadian natives will achieve more autonomy.
Self-government will be the likely form of this new found autonomy.
The natives will probably not attain full autonomy because of the
numerous nations, lands, their numerous locations, and the improbability
of financial self-sufficiency. Regardless, natives in Canada will soon have
some of the autonomy they so desire.
In conclusion, it would appear that the territories lack the ability
to qualify for self-determination under international law. However, the
Quebecois people may have a better claim of self-determination, and
the natives assuredly have a solid claim. Whether these international
legal claims influence Canadian lawmakers may rest upon the pressure
they receive internationally and internally. Support for most provinces
and territories can be presumed to be insignificant. Support for Quebec,
however, due to its notoriety should garner significant support. Support
for the natives as aboriginal peoples will certainly be substantial and
find sources throughout the world. The reason for this is the world
trend of recognizing aboriginal rights and the value in preserving these
rights.'6 9 The United States, the country that can influence Canada like
no other, will probably not put any pressure on Canada to grant native
rights because this would damage its own domestic position in relation
to natives in the United States.
V. CONCLUSION
Contrary to reality is the notion that "Canada is probably finished
as a viable country anyway. So let's party."'170 Canada is not yet in the
process of separation. It is, however, on the brink. While it may be
possible to temporarily satiate the parties reform within the current
system or even changing the present system is preferable to separation.
However, should a province, territory, or the natives desire to sep-
arate from Canada they will be required to have consent from the rest
of Canada, a constitutional amendment, or possibly establish a successful
new government which in itself establishes a new legal order. Interna-
168. Raidza Torres, The Rights of Indigenous Populations: The Emerging International
Norm, 16 Yale J. Int'l L. 127, 159-60 (1991).
169. Id. at 155-63.
170. This is what Peter C. Newman believes is Trudeau's rallying cry. Peter C. Newman,
Blaming Trudeau for Our Troubles, Maclean's, Sept. 28, 1992, at 46.
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tional law allows separation, however, recognition of a new entity may
not be readily forthcoming, thus hindering its acquisition of state status.
Whatever the outcome may be, one thing is certain-the constitutional
structure of Canada will not remain the same.
Kevin Sneesby
